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Compensation for Nonpecuniary Loss: Revising 
Louisiana Civil Code Article 1998 to Reflect 
Litvinoff’s Damage-Based Approach  
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a collector of fine wines. He acquired this hobby from 
his father, who also collected wines and passed down his collection 
to his son upon his death. The collection has now amassed a 
significant monetary value. One day, the wine owner contracted 
with a company to make adjustments to the thermostat in his wine 
cellar. An error on the part of a company employee raised the 
temperature in the cellar too high, causing all of the wine to spoil. 
Louisiana law is clear that the wine owner can recover damages for 
the loss of the wine’s value in a breach of contract action.1 But the 
wine owner sustained another loss that day—the loss of a 
collection that he enjoyed and shared with his deceased father. The 
collection of wine, although having a significant monetary value, 
also had a significant “nonpecuniary” value.2 Under the current 
state of Louisiana law on obligations, the wine owner would have 
difficulty convincing a court that nonpecuniary damages are 
appropriate under Louisiana Civil Code article 1998 and would 
likely receive no compensation for the nonpecuniary loss that he 
suffered.3  
Actions for breach of contract most commonly involve injuries 
easily and appropriately susceptible of pecuniary or monetary 
valuation.4 Sometimes though, the loss felt by the obligee is not an 
exclusively financial injury, such as the loss felt by the wine owner 
as a result of his emotional attachment to his wine collection. 
When “the impairment affects an interest beyond the scope of the 
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 1. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1995 (2015) (“Damages are measured by the loss 
sustained by the obligee and the profit of which he has been deprived.”).  
 2. “Nonpecuniary harm then should be taken to refer to such damages or 
injury that cannot, strictly speaking, be measured in monetary terms.” Louisiana 
State Law Institute, Supplemental Memorandum on Damages for Nonpecuniary 
Losses at 2, Prepared for Meeting of the Obligations Revision Committee (July 
25, 1980) (on file with the Louisiana State Law Institute) [hereinafter 
Supplemental Memorandum on Damages for Nonpecuniary Losses]. 
 3. SAÚL LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS § 6.7, in 6 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW 
TREATISE 163 (2d ed. 1999) (contrasting the general acceptance of nonpecuniary 
damages in delictual actions with those in contractual actions). See also LA. CIV. 
CODE art. 1998 (2015).  
 4. Supplemental Memorandum on Damages for Nonpecuniary Losses, 
supra note 2, at 1. 
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obligee’s patrimony . . . the damage is of a moral nature.”5 When an 
obligee suffers such an injury, it can be repaired by nonpecuniary 
damages.6 Damages of this type frequently include those for mental 
anguish, embarrassment, inconvenience, humiliation,7 and loss of 
consortium.8 Other types of nonpecuniary damages that are sought 
less often include “other encroachments upon the personality such 
as emotional distress, loss of amenities of life, injury to honor or 
diminution of a person’s reputation.”9  
Former Louisiana Civil Code article 1934 governed nonpecuniary 
damages and was interpreted inconsistently by Louisiana courts, 
leading to confusion for litigants, practitioners, and judges. After a 
significant period of unpredictability in both the lower courts and the 
Louisiana Supreme Court, as well as critical commentary in the state 
law reviews, the Obligations Committee of the Louisiana State Law 
Institute discussed changes to article 1934.10 Led by Professor Saúl 
Litvinoff, the Committee recommended to the Legislature a revision 
of article 1934 with the intention of providing clarity to this obscure 
area of the law.11 The Louisiana Legislature adopted article 1998, 
effective January 1, 1985.12 Mainly, the Committee dealt with when 
and to what extent compensation for nonpecuniary loss should be 
permitted.13  
Now, the Louisiana Civil Code permits recovery of nonpecuniary 
damages for the breach of conventional obligations under article 
1998.14 However, the Louisiana Supreme Court has held that such 
                                                                                                             
 5. Saúl Litvinoff, Moral Damages, 38 LA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1977) [hereinafter 
Litvinoff, Moral Damages]. After recognizing that there are interests worth 
protecting beyond the financial realm, French writers developed a concept 
known as “moral patrimony.” See LITVINOFF, supra note 3, § 6.4, at 159. 
Litvinoff described one’s moral patrimony as a compilation of “intangible assets 
such as honor, reputation, feelings, and peace of mind.” Id. 
 6. Litvinoff, Moral Damages, supra note 5, at 1.  
 7. Gary P. Graphia, Comment, Nonpecuniary Damages: A Guide to 
Damage Awards Under Louisiana Civil Code Article 1998, 50 LA. L. REV. 797, 
797–98 (1990). 
 8. LITVINOFF, supra note 3, § 6.1, at 157. 
 9. Supplemental Memorandum on Damages for Nonpecuniary Losses, 
supra note 2, at 2. See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 1998 cmt. e (2015) (excluding 
damages for “mere worry or vexation”). 
 10. Supplemental Memorandum on Damages for Nonpecuniary Losses, 
supra note 2, at 1. 
 11. See discussion infra Part II.  
 12. Act No. 331, 1984 La. Acts 156 (“To amend and reenact Titles III and IV 
of Book III of the Civil Code, to comprise Articles 1756 through 2057 . . . .”).  
 13. Supplemental Memorandum on Damages for Nonpecuniary Losses, 
supra note 2, at 1. 
 14. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1998 (2015). Former article 1934 was repealed in 
1985. See Act No. 331, 1984 La. Acts 156. 
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damages are only available in limited circumstances—where the 
nonpecuniary elements of a contract are “significant.”15 Although 
nonpecuniary damages are rarely awarded in breach of contract 
actions, it is unquestionable that nonpecuniary, or non-patrimonial 
interests, can be injured by an obligor’s nonperformance of an 
obligation.16 As a result of the Louisiana Supreme Court’s limited 
grant of nonpecuniary damages, some obligees are left with 
uncompensated nonpecuniary injuries.17 This Comment considers 
whether the 1985 revision that resulted in article 1998 successfully 
clarified the availability of nonpecuniary damages for the breach of 
conventional obligations and offers suggestions to better serve 
litigants seeking damages for nonpecuniary loss. 
Part I of this Comment discusses former Louisiana Civil Code 
article 1934, the legislation that governed the availability of 
nonpecuniary damages in Louisiana, and the effect it had on 
Louisiana jurisprudence. Part II analyzes the 1985 revision of article 
1934, first discussing the drafters’ attempt to clarify the state of the 
law surrounding nonpecuniary damages, then highlighting the post-
revision ambiguities. Part III evaluates why the restrictive 
interpretation given to current article 1998 by Louisiana courts has 
hindered its availability to serve litigants and is inconsistent with the 
original intent of the Obligations Committee. Finally, Part IV offers a 
model article that attempts to remedy the conflicting jurisprudence 
and legislation in Louisiana and to finally give Louisiana courts and 
practitioners guidance on the availability of nonpecuniary damages 
for the breach of conventional obligations.  
I. ARTICLE 1934 OF THE 1870 CIVIL CODE: PRE-REVISION 
NONPECUNIARY DAMAGES IN LOUISIANA 
Generally, damages in contract are measured by what the 
parties contemplated during the formation of the obligation, 
usually the loss sustained, including the profits deprived by the 
                                                                                                             
 15. See, e.g., Young v. Ford Motor Co., 595 So. 2d 1123 (La. 1992); 
Lafleur v. John Deere Co., 491 So. 2d 624 (La. 1986); Meador v. Toyota of 
Jefferson, 332 So. 2d 433 (La. 1976).  
 16. Litvinoff, Moral Damages, supra note 5, at 1.  
 17. The focus of this Comment is on a litigant’s ability to recover damages 
in contractual actions. It is not intended to provide guidance on damage recovery 
in delictual actions, which may or may not be available depending on the 
circumstances of the claim. For a discussion of the delictual equivalent of 
nonpecuniary damages, see WILLIAM CRAWFORD, TORT LAW §§ 28.1–28.5, in 
12 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE (2d ed. 1999). 
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obligee.18 Contrast damages in contract, which are based on 
foreseeability and the parties’ intentions, with those in tort, which 
are meant to compensate and make the victim whole again.19 
Whether this distinction has merit remains questionable because 
“any interest worthy of protection, even if not of a patrimonial 
nature, may be the object of an obligation.”20 The vast majority of 
contracts involve pecuniary interests, but others have mixed 
interests—both pecuniary and nonpecuniary.21 Seldom will a 
contract involve an exclusively nonpecuniary interest.22 However, 
“the fact that damage of an exclusively moral nature occurs only 
seldom is no justification for a denial of recovery where such 
damage has been proved.”23 Louisiana’s interest in fully 
compensating an obligee has wavered in the past, and whether that 
interest exists now is the subject of this Comment.  
Whereas Louisiana repairs nonpecuniary losses with 
nonpecuniary damages, the French repair these injuries with 
dommage moral.24 The term dommage moral is more accurate than 
the Louisiana label because it acknowledges that, although the 
damage is repaired in money, the loss felt is nonpecuniary or 
“moral.”25 This term may be more appropriate because the 
availability of nonpecuniary damages hinges on a distinction based on 
the nature of the injured right as well as the actual damage suffered.26 
If the nonperformance of an obligation results in nonpecuniary or 
nonpatrimonial harm, nonpecuniary damages should be available, 
although that has not always been the case.27 In contrast, when the 
nonperformance of an obligation causes damage to a right that is 
patrimonial in nature, nonpecuniary damages are not available, but 
                                                                                                             
 18. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1995 (2015); see also LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1996–
1997 (2015) (governing relationship of damages to obligors in good or bad 
faith). 
 19. SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 64:12 (4th ed.). 
 20. Litvinoff, Moral Damages, supra note 5, at 2. 
 21. LITVINOFF, supra note 3, § 6.7, at 164. 
 22. Litvinoff, Moral Damages, supra note 5, at 3. 
 23. Id.  
 24. LITVINOFF, supra note 3, § 6.1, at 155–57. See also Litvinoff, Moral 
Damages, supra note 5, at 1.  
 25. LITVINOFF, supra note 3, § 6.1, at 155. Additionally, moral losses are 
those which “are not able to be appreciated in money, i.e., not capable of a 
precise monetary calculation.” Agustín Parise, Non-Pecuniary Damages in the 
Louisiana Civil Code Article 1928 (May 18, 2006) (unpublished LL.M. Paper, 
Paul M. Hebert Law Center) (on file with Paul M. Hebert Law Library, Paul M. 
Hebert Law Center). 
 26. Supplemental Memorandum on Damages for Nonpecuniary Losses, 
supra note 2, at 1. 
 27. Id. See, e.g., Bowes v. Fox-Stanley Photo Prods., Inc., 279 So. 2d 844 
(La. Ct. App. 1980).  
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general compensatory damages are.28 Although both injuries are 
compensated in money, the availability of nonpecuniary damages 
depends on what type of right was actually injured by the obligor’s 
failure to perform properly.29 
A. Background on Former Louisiana Civil Code Article 1934 
Until 1985, Louisiana Civil Code article 1934 governed the 
availability of nonpecuniary damages for the breach of conventional 
obligations in Louisiana.30 Article 1934(3) provided: 
Although the general rule is, that damages are the amount of 
the loss the creditor has sustained, or of the gain of which he 
has been deprived, yet there are cases in which damages may 
be assessed without calculating altogether on the pecuniary 
loss, or the privation of pecuniary gain to the party. Where 
the contract has for its object the gratification of some 
intellectual enjoyment, whether in religion, morality or taste, 
or some convenience or other legal gratification, although 
these are not appreciated in money by the parties, yet 
damages are due for their breach: a contract for a religious 
or charitable foundation, a promise of marriage, or an 
engagement for the work of some of the fine arts, are objects 
and examples of this rule.31  
The italicized portion made its debut in the Louisiana Civil Code in 
1825 as article 1928 but was later renumbered to article 1934 in 
1870.32 Unlike many of Louisiana’s other articles, article 1928 was 
not based on an article that existed in the French Code Civil.33 
Perhaps article 1928 attempted to codify what was merely 
jurisprudential and doctrinal in the French system.34 Louisiana’s 
article was written in both French and English, but the translation 
into English gave rise to questions regarding its accuracy.35 
Professor Litvinoff believed that the English translation was not 
                                                                                                             
 28. See generally LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1994–2004 (2015). 
 29. The confusion created by calling damages for nonpecuniary loss 
“nonpecuniary damages” troubled Professor Litvinoff, which led him to 
advocate for the use of the term “moral damages.” See Litvinoff, Moral 
Damages, supra note 5, at 1. 
 30. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1934 (repealed 1985).  
 31. Id. (emphasis added). 
 32. Meador v. Toyota of Jefferson, Inc., 332 So. 2d 433, 436 (La. 1976). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Parise, supra note 25, at 49. One scholar traces article 1928 back to the 
doctrinal writings and interpretations of Toullier and Domat, two early 
commentators of the French Code Civil. Id. 
 35. Litvinoff, Moral Damages, supra note 5, at 7. 
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accurate, because the French version “offer[ed] a wider scope and 
a greater generality than [was] reflected in the official English 
version.”36 Despite the translation discrepancy, Louisiana courts 
strictly interpreted article 1934 in an attempt to accord with the 
original French version.37 Because the English version was the 
law, litigants used article 1934 unpredictably as a tool to recover 
nonpecuniary damages with varying degrees of success.  
B. The Louisiana Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Article 1934(3) 
The Louisiana Supreme Court heavily analyzed article 1934(3) 
in its 1976 decision of Meador v. Toyota of Jefferson, Inc.38 In 
Meador, the 18-year-old plaintiff sought nonpecuniary damages 
from the defendant, Toyota of Jefferson, for a long delay in 
repairing her first car.39 Based on its interpretation of article 1934, 
the trial court awarded the plaintiff $700 for “aggravation, distress, 
and inconvenience” due to the defendant’s “breach of the implied 
obligation to repair within a reasonable time.”40 The Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeal reversed the damage award, and the plaintiff 
appealed to the Louisiana Supreme Court.41  
The Louisiana Supreme Court granted writs to consider whether 
nonpecuniary damages were appropriate.42 The plaintiff in Meador 
made a textual argument using the disjunctive “or” in article 1934 
and asserted that the inclusion of “or” meant that “some 
convenience” or “intellectual gratification” were grounds for 
recovery of damages under article 1934.43 This distinction between 
physical versus intellectual gratification has produced fractured 
                                                                                                             
 36. Id. at 8. See infra text accompanying note 62. 
 37. For a source analysis of article 1934, see Meador v. Toyota of Jefferson, 
Inc., 332 So. 2d 433, 436 (La. 1976) (“We find the French source provision of 
1934(3) in the 1825 Civil Code, if not controlling, at least persuasive in our 
present interpretation of the article’s ambiguous counterpart in our 1870 Civil 
Code.”).  
 38. Id. at 433. See supra text accompanying note 31 (reproducing former 
article 1934(3) in full).  
 39. Meador, 332 So. 2d at 434. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Meador v. Toyota of Jefferson, Inc., 322 So. 2d 802 (La. Ct. App. 
1975).  
 42. Meador, 332 So. 2d at 433. 
 43. Id. Before the revision, the Civil Code and the interpreting jurisprudence 
often used the word “intellectual” to describe what the current Code usually calls 
“nonpecuniary.” See Louisiana State Law Institute, Document Prepared for 
Meeting of the Obligations Committee at 6 (July 27, 1979) (on file with Louisiana 
State Law Institute) [hereinafter Louisiana State Law Institute, July 27, 1979].  
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views in Louisiana’s lower courts, which the Supreme Court 
candidly admitted.44 
The defendants advocated for the strict view of nonpecuniary 
damage awards, which permitted such damages when the object 
was exclusively intellectual.45 Although the Court stated that it 
“has never adopted a strict view, but has reached results favoring 
the broader interpretation of Art. 1934(3),”46 some dicta from the 
Meador opinion suggests otherwise.47 As proof of the Court’s 
allowance of nonpecuniary damages in cases where there were 
both physical and intellectual objects, the Louisiana Supreme 
Court cited cases from as far back as 1903, 1906, and 1939.48 After 
examining the French and English text of article 1928 of the 
Louisiana Civil Code of 1825, the Court concluded that the 
original drafters did not contemplate physical gratification and that 
the disjunctive “or” should not be read to allow for convenience49 
                                                                                                             
 44. Meador, 332 So. 2d at 435. The Court discussed the several different 
approaches that courts have taken in interpreting article 1934, such as the liberal 
position and a broader position. See infra note 46.  
 45. Meador, 332 So. 2d at 433. 
 46. Id. The broader view the Court is referring to allows recovery “where 
the object or objects of the contract include elements of intellectual and physical 
gratification.” Id. The Court gave the example of Lewis v. Holmes, 34 So. 66 
(La. 1903), in which the Court allowed recovery of nonpecuniary damages 
where the plaintiff never received four dresses for her wedding trousseau. See 
Meador, 332 So. 2d at 433. The contract had features that were “both physical 
(her need for comfortable clothing), and intellectual (her preference for style, or 
‘taste’ and concern with her appearance on her wedding day and on her 
honeymoon).” Id. at 436.  
 47. Meador, 332 So. 2d at 435. The Court later stated that “[w]here an 
object, or the exclusive object, of a contract, is physical gratification, (or 
anything other than intellectual gratification) nonpecuniary damages as a 
consequence of nonfulfillment of that object are not recoverable.” Id. at 437. By 
saying “where an object . . . of a contract[] is physical gratification,” 
nonpecuniary damages are not available, the Court is essentially prohibiting 
recovery of nonpecuniary damages in any case where there is any degree of 
physical gratification. The contract that has no degree of physical gratification 
will likely never exist or occur rarely. Later, the Court says that if a principal 
object is intellectual enjoyment, then damages are recoverable, which seems to 
imply that there is room for a lesser object. Id. Whether the Court believes 
multiple objects are possible has been the source of significant confusion. 
 48. Id. at 435–36. See supra note 46 (discussing Lewis). The Court also 
cited O’Meallie v. Moreau, 41 So. 243 (La. 1906), and Jiles v. Venus 
Community Center Benevolent Mutual Aid Ass’n, 186 So. 342 (La. 1939). In 
both of these cases, the Court awarded damages for nonpecuniary loss in breach 
of contract actions. The Court distinguished the analysis in these opinions from 
that in Meador because never before had they “historically viewed the source of 
Article 1934(3) and the origin thereof.” Meador, 332 So. 2d at 436.  
 49. See generally Steve M. Marks, Note, Nonpecuniary Damages in Breach 
of Contract: Louisiana Civil Code Article 1934, 37 LA. L. REV. 625 (1977) 
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or physical gratification recovery.50 This analysis led the Court to 
hold that under former article 1934, the object of the contract must 
be either exclusively or principally intellectual to support an award 
of nonpecuniary damages.51 This result has been the subject of 
criticism; as one scholar stated, “the court drew a distinction 
between intellectual and physical gratification that is not” supported 
by the terms and history of the article.52 
Justice Dixon’s dissent in Meador addressed the tension in 
refusing to award damages for aggravation and distress where they 
have been proven simply because the litigation arose out of a 
contract action.53 He stated: 
In a society as dependent on the automobile as ours, where 
a car is not only a convenience but often a necessity, a 
plaintiff should be able to recover damages representing the 
aggravation, distress and inconvenience suffered when the 
repairman breaches his duty to fix the car within a 
reasonable time.54 
Justice Dixon framed his dissent from a fairness perspective, and 
unlike the majority, put no weight on the significance of the 
plaintiff’s intellectual interest and how that interest influenced the 
contract.55  
Following Meador, Professor Litvinoff questioned the 
“multiple object” argument posed by the Court.56 Specifically, 
Professor Litvinoff questioned whether article 1934 only covered 
obligations with exclusively intellectual objects or whether it also 
                                                                                                             
 
(discussing the different interpretations of the word “convenience” as used in 
article 1934 and how those interpretations affect the nonpecuniary damage 
analysis).  
 50. Meador, 332 So. 2d at 437. The Court equated the term “convenience” 
used in article 1934(3) with physical gratification. In Jack v. Henry, 128 So. 2d 
62, 72 (La. Ct. App. 1961), the Louisiana First Circuit used the “convenience 
rationale” to award damages to a homeowner who suffered inconvenience 
resulting from a contractor’s breach of the obligation. The Court does not 
acknowledge that the First Circuit also discussed some intellectual benefits 
derived from the construction of this custom home, such as a place to provide 
for his family and “for the express purpose of fulfilling defendant’s individual 
conception of a home.” Id. 
 51. Meador, 332 So. 2d at 437.  
 52. Kathryn Bloomfield, Comment, Recovering Nonpecuniary Damages for 
Breach of Contract Under Louisiana Law, 47 LA. L. REV. 541, 541 (1987).  
 53. Meador, 332 So. 2d at 438 (Dixon, J., dissenting). 
 54. Id.  
 55. Compare id. at 437 (majority opinion), with id. at 438–39 (Dixon, J., 
dissenting). 
 56. See Litvinoff, Moral Damages, supra note 5, at 10. 
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covered obligations that were made for multiple objects, some 
intellectual and some pecuniary.57 Professor Litvinoff gave as an 
example a contract for a spacious home, which in addition to being 
a smart investment, also provides intellectual enjoyment by offering 
comfort and security to the family who owns the home.58  
Professor Litvinoff suggested two principal reasons why article 
1934 should be broadly interpreted.59 First, the article simply did not 
include a requirement that the intellectual interest be significant or 
exclusive, and to read such a requirement into the text would be an 
inappropriate alteration.60 Additionally, Professor Litvinoff argued 
that the English version of article 1934(3) “contains quite a few 
departures from the French original”—differences that truly affect 
the article’s meaning.61 He believed that article 1934 should have 
been translated as follows:  
When a contract was made for the purpose of securing to a 
party a purely intellectual enjoyment, such as that related to 
religion, morality, taste, personal comfort or any other kind 
of satisfaction of that order, though such things were not 
evaluated in money by the parties, damages are nevertheless 
due for breach of the obligation. A contract the purpose of 
which is a religious or charitable foundation, a promise of 
marriage, or the undertaking to do a work in any of the fine 
arts, is an example of a case where this rule can be 
applied.62 
Professor Litvinoff argued that the drafters’ failure to include 
“exclusive” before the word “purely” in his translation of article 
1934 rendered such an interpretation contrary to the text, purpose, 
and history of the article.63 Litvinoff contended that the examples 
mentioned at the end of former article 1934 were merely illustrative 
of contracts that may have warranted application of article 1934.64 
The fact that almost all of these examples contain exclusively 
intellectual interests is not dispositive of whether the drafters’ 
intention was to incorporate an exclusivity requirement.65 
                                                                                                             
 57. See id.  
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 11.  
 60. Id.  
 61. Id. at 7. 
 62. Id. at 7–8 (changes depicted in italics). But see Meador v. Toyota of 
Jefferson, Inc., 332 So. 2d 433, 437 (La. 1976) (supporting a slightly different 
English translation).  
 63. See Litvinoff, Moral Damages, supra note 5, at 11. 
 64. Id.  
 65. Id.  
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The second reason nonpecuniary damages should be generally 
available, suggested Professor Litvinoff, is that an interpretation 
that limits the scope of the article would leave obligees’ injured 
interests unprotected in a variety of situations.66 Fairness requires 
reparation for injury sustained above financial loss.67 Professor 
Litvinoff used as an example a traveler who contracts to cross the 
Atlantic Ocean for business reasons and chooses to do so by 
purchasing a ticket in first class on a cruise ship.68 If the ship is 
unable to seat the passenger and forces him to ride in steerage, 
should he not, in the interest of fairness, be allowed to recover 
more than just the difference in ticket value?69 Under the Meador 
approach, a court would likely deny such recovery because the 
traveler’s search for enjoyment, by indulging in the comfort of first 
class, was not a “principal object of [his] contract” to cross the 
ocean.70 Like the traveler example, courts based their arguments 
for denying nonpecuniary damages under former article 1934(3) 
largely on this distinction between whether the nonpecuniary 
object was principal or incidental, despite the absence of such 
language from the text of the article. This is a further illustration of 
the Louisiana Supreme Court’s unwillingness to interpret the 
article in accordance with its plain text. The Court’s limited 
interpretation of former article 1934 in Meador and the legal 
commentary that followed heightened the need for a revision of the 
law on nonpecuniary damages.  
II. A LONG TIME COMING: THE 1985 OBLIGATIONS REVISION AND 
CURRENT ARTICLE 1998 
Realizing the need for clarity in the law surrounding 
nonpecuniary damages, the Louisiana Legislature adopted the 
recommendations of the Louisiana State Law Institute71 to replace 
                                                                                                             
 66. Id.  
 67. See id. at 11–12. 
 68. Id. In this example, the traveler is fulfilling multiple needs—specifically 
his need for transportation, a traditionally economic interest, as well as 
“indulg[ing] in the comfort” of riding in first class. Id. at 11.  
 69. Id. at 11–12. 
 70. Meador v. Toyota of Jefferson, Inc., 332 So. 2d 433, 437 (La. 1976).  
 71. The Louisiana Legislature designated the Louisiana State Law Institute 
as “an official, advisory law revision commission, law reform agency and legal 
research agency of the State of Louisiana.” John F. Tucker, President, Louisiana 
State Law Institute, Remarks at the First Meeting of the Louisiana State Law 
Institute (Mar. 16, 1940), available at www.lsli.org/purpose, archived at http: 
//perma.cc/26JE-35JP. The declared purpose of the Law Institute is “to promote 
and encourage the clarification and simplification of the law of Louisiana and its 
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former article 1934(3) with current article 1998, which became 
effective January 1, 1985.72 Article 1998 now states: 
Damages for nonpecuniary loss may be recovered when the 
contract, because of its nature, is intended to gratify a 
nonpecuniary interest and, because of the circumstances 
surrounding the formation or the nonperformance of the 
contract, the obligor knew, or should have known, that his 
failure to perform would cause that kind of loss. 
 
Regardless of the nature of the contract, these damages may 
be recovered also when the obligor intended, through his 
failure, to aggrieve the feelings of the obligee.73 
The new article essentially provides two “doors” through 
which litigants can recover nonpecuniary damages. The second 
paragraph of the article provides for the recovery of nonpecuniary 
damages, regardless of the nature of the contract, when the obligor 
intended to aggrieve the feelings of the obligee through his failure 
to perform.74 However, this provision has been largely dormant in 
practice.75  
The first paragraph, on the other hand, creates two 
requirements for the recovery of nonpecuniary damages in breach 
of contract actions, both of which are modified by the clause 
“when the contract, because of its nature.”76 The two requirements 
imposed by the first paragraph of article 1998 are that (1) the 
contract be “intended to gratify a nonpecuniary interest” due to its 
nature; and that (2) the obligor knew or should have known from 
the circumstances surrounding the formation or breach of the 
contract that the obligee would suffer a nonpecuniary loss.77  
These two paragraphs create quite a contrast—one based on the 
nature of the contract and the other awarding damages regardless 
of the nature of the contract.78 The inclusion of the “nature 
inquiry” is likely evidence of the Louisiana State Law Institute’s 
                                                                                                             
 
better adaptation to present social needs; to secure the better administration of 
justice and to carry on scholarly legal research and scientific legal work.” Id. 
 72. Act No. 331, 1984 La. Acts 718, 869. 
 73. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1998 (2015).  
 74. This Comment addresses the paragraphs in reverse order from how they 
appear in article 1998 because the second paragraph is rarely referenced or used. 
For further discussion of this aspect of article 1998, see infra Part IV.A.5.  
 75. See infra Part IV.A.5. 
 76. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1998 (2015).  
 77. Id. 
 78. See id. 
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intent to limit nonpecuniary damages to contracts of a specific 
type—those that reasonable persons would agree contemplate 
nonpecuniary or moral interests.79 However, courts often do not 
deny nonpecuniary damages based on the nature of the contract. 
Instead, courts tend to deny damages based on the significance of 
the interests, which has been the source of confusion due to article 
1998’s silence on this issue.80  
The total absence of any discussion in article 1998 involving 
the degree of significance that the nonpecuniary object of the 
contract must carry is startling after Meador, given that the Court’s 
analysis largely depended on this question.81 Instead, article 1998 
speaks in terms of contracts that are intended to gratify a 
nonpecuniary interest, which means the contract may satisfy other 
interests simultaneously.82 The failure to include the terms 
“significant” or “principal” as modifiers could indicate that the 
new article does not embrace the standard articulated under 
Meador.83 
There is further support for the proposition that the Revision 
Committee intended to overrule Meador by replacing “gratification 
of some intellectual enjoyment” in former article 1934 with the 
phrase “intended to gratify a nonpecuniary interest” in revised 
article 1998.84 The elimination of the designation “intellectual” 
highlights a more accurate reality about Louisiana obligations—
they often encompass nonpecuniary characteristics even where the 
contract was entered to gratify physical, pecuniary interests.85 In 
fact, comment (a) to article 1998 states: “This article is new. It 
changes the law in part.”86 Unfortunately, it is uncertain how 
                                                                                                             
 79. The propriety of basing the availability of nonpecuniary damages on the 
nature of contracts is questionable and discussed infra Part III.  
 80. See, e.g., Young v. Ford Motor Co. Inc., 595 So. 2d 1123 (La. 1992); 
Meador v. Toyota of Jefferson, Inc., 332 So. 2d 433 (La. 1976). 
 81. See Meador, 332 So. 2d 433. Surprisingly, revised article 1998 does not 
reference an “object” of a contract at all. See Graphia, supra note 7, at 801 
(comparing the texts of the two articles and noting that “an award of 
nonpecuniary damages should no longer be restricted to cases . . . where the 
principal or exclusive object is the gratification of a nonpecuniary interest”).  
 82. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1998 cmt. c (2015) (discussing illustrations of 
nonpecuniary interests).  
 83. See Graphia, supra note 7, at 801–02.  
 84. Id. at 801. 
 85. Id. at 802. 
 86. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1998 cmt. a (2015). The comment states in its 
entirety: 
This article is new. It changes the law in part. As interpreted in Meador v. 
Toyota of Jefferson, Inc., 332 So.2d 433 (La.1976), C.C. Art. 1934(3) 
(1870) allows recovery of damages for nonpecuniary losses only for 
breach of a contract which has “intellectual enjoyment” as its principal or 
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article 1998 changes the law, as the pre-revision law under former 
article 1934 and Meador provided little guidance on the availability 
of damages for nonpecuniary loss. Additionally, comment (a) 
outlines the departure from Meador by pointing to textual 
differences between revised article 1998 and the interpretation given 
to former article 1934(3) in Meador—specifically the elimination of 
the requirement that “intellectual enjoyment” be the principal or 
exclusive purpose.87 Despite the comments to article 1998, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court, in subsequent cases, has continued to 
affirm Meador and its proposition that a significant nonpecuniary 
interest is required to recover damages for nonpecuniary loss in 
Louisiana breach of contract actions.88 
A. The Louisiana Supreme Court’s Response to Revised Article 
1998 
Following the revision, a plain text reading of article 1998 
coupled with comment (a) signaled that courts might allow 
nonpecuniary damages in breach of contract actions with greater 
frequency. However, two seminal cases decided by the Louisiana 
Supreme Court in the years that followed proved that would not be 
the case.  
1. Lafleur v. John Deere Co.89 
In 1986, the Louisiana Supreme Court first analyzed article 
1998 in Lafleur v. John Deere Co.90 In Lafleur, the plaintiffs were 
farmers who used a John Deere grain drill in the planting of their 
soybean crop.91 A “main selling feature” of the grain drill was its 
                                                                                                             
 
exclusive purpose. Under this Article, such damages are recoverable 
when a contract has been made for the gratification of a nonpecuniary 
interest and, because of circumstances surrounding its formation or 
breach, the obligor knew or should have known that his failure to 
perform would cause nonpecuniary loss. Such damages are also 
recoverable when regardless of the nature of the contract or the purpose 
for which it has been made, the obligor, through his breach, intends to 
aggrieve or hurt the feelings of the obligee.  
Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See, e.g., Young v. Ford Motor Co., Inc., 595 So. 2d 1123 (La. 1992).  
 89. Lafleur v. John Deere Co., 491 So. 2d 624 (La. 1986).  
 90. Id.  
 91. Id. at 626. Lafleur had delictual elements not discussed in this Comment 
because the Court decided the damages issue independent of the legal theory on 
which the plaintiff’s claim was based. Graphia, supra note 7, at 800–01. 
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ability to plant crops at a uniform, pre-set depth.92 There was a 
malfunction in the grain drill that prevented seeds from planting at 
the desired depth, resulting in decreased crop return.93 The farmers 
sued separately, and each was awarded nonpecuniary damages.94 
On review, the Louisiana Supreme Court addressed whether 
nonpecuniary damages were appropriate.95 The Court used Lafleur 
as an opportunity to discuss the law post-Meador and post-
revision. However, this discussion was unnecessary because the 
facts arose before the revision of article 1934—meaning Meador 
applied.96 The Court insisted that Meador survived the revision, 
stating:  
[Respondents] contend, and the court of appeal stated, that 
“the Meador rule is no longer inflexibly applied to preclude 
awards of nonpecuniary damages” in breach of contract 
cases. This position is not well taken. In fact no opinion of 
this court after Meador has repudiated its holding, despite 
criticism by some Law Review commentators.97 
The Court later called the revision a “minor language change” that 
merely incorporated the Meador approach into former article 
1934(3), notwithstanding the new article and commentary clearly 
stating the contrary.98 The Lafleur Court found that the phrase 
from former article 1934—“for its object the gratification of some 
intellectual enjoyment”—meant the same thing as the new 
language “to gratify a nonpecuniary interest.”99 The Court stated 
that the addition of the phrase “because of the circumstances 
surrounding the formation or the nonperformance of the contract, 
the obligor knew, or should have known, that his failure to perform 
would cause that kind of loss” hardly added anything to the new 
article because this requirement was implicit in former article 
1934.100 The Court, in an unnecessary analysis of post-revision 
law, concluded that the Legislature’s failure to adopt Professor 
                                                                                                             
 92. Lafleur, 491 So. 2d at 626. 
 93. Id. at 627. The crop was about 20 bushels less per acre than the parish 
average. Id. at 627–28. 
 94. Fontenot was awarded $125,000.00 for mental anguish, and Lafleur was 
awarded $10,000.00 for mental anguish, aggravation, stress, and inconvenience. 
Id. at 625. The Court of Appeal affirmed. Id. at 625–26. 
 95. Id. at 628. 
 96. Id. at 628–30. The facts of Lafleur arose in 1980. Id. at 630. 
 97. Id. at 628 (quoting Fontenot v. F. Hollier & Sons, 478 So. 2d 1379, 
1386 (La. Ct. App. 1986)). 
 98. Id. at 626. 
 99. See id. at 628–30; see also Graphia, supra note 7, at 800–01. 
 100. Lafleur, 491 So. 2d at 629. 
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Litvinoff’s proposed article meant it intended to incorporate the 
law under Meador.101 
It is no surprise that the Court concluded that nonpecuniary 
damages were inappropriate under these circumstances, where 
there was a purely commercial contract between a farmer and a 
grain drill manufacturer. The Court could have decided that the 
nature of the contract involved was not appropriate for 
nonpecuniary damages and saved the discussion of article 1998 
and its conformity with Meador for a better case with facts more 
favorable to an award of nonpecuniary damages.102 Although the 
result reached by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Lafleur is sound, 
the Court’s discussion in dicta of article 1998 and the Meador 
standard was premature. This discussion was highly illustrative of 
the Louisiana Supreme Court’s insistence upon a narrow reading 
of article 1998, even when the plain text or drafters’ intentions, as 
reflected in comment (a) to article 1998, may not support such a 
reading.103  
2. Young v. Ford Motor Co.104 
Six years after Lafleur, the Louisiana Supreme Court again 
addressed nonpecuniary damages under article 1998 in Young v. 
Ford Motor Co.105 Young involved the reversal of a trial court’s 
award of nonpecuniary damages.106 The plaintiff in Young 
purchased a pickup truck to be used in connection with his service 
station, as well as for recreation and pleasure.107 The truck, 
                                                                                                             
 101. Id. at 629–30. The Court cited Professor Litvinoff’s proposals to article 
1998: “Moral damages [Damages for pecuniary [sic] loss] may be recovered 
according to the nature of the contract, or according to the circumstances 
surrounding an obligor’s failure to perform. Such damages shall not be 
recovered for mere worry or vexation.” Id. at 629 n.6. According to the Court, 
the comment that accompanied the proposed article read:  
(a) This article is new. It changes the law in part since it provides that 
moral damages may be recovered also for the failure to perform an 
obligation arising from a contract whose object is not for the exclusive 
“intellectual enjoyment” of the obligee, thereby departing from the rule 
established in Meador v. Toyota of Jefferson, Inc., 322 So. 2d 802 
(1976). 
Id. 
 102. Since Lafleur was decided under Meador, there was no reason for a 
detailed analysis of the new law, especially when the purpose of such an 
analysis was to revive the law as it existed under Meador.  
 103. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1998 cmt. a (2015).  
 104. Young v. Ford Motor Co., Inc., 595 So. 2d 1123 (La. 1992). 
 105. Id.  
 106. Id. at 1124. 
 107. Id. at 1125. 
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referred to by the Court as a “lemon,” had multiple defects that 
required maintenance over ten times.108 Because of the truck’s 
defects, Young’s doctor testified that he suffered from depression, 
was tense and angry, and experienced problems with sex.109 The 
jury awarded Young $3,750 in mental anguish damages in 
connection with the sale of the truck.110 The court of appeal 
reversed the damages award, and this was the only issue contested 
on appeal.111 Young is governed by the provisions on liability of 
the seller of defective products, which contemplate a damage 
award to the plaintiff.112 After concluding that Louisiana law 
favors restoration of the status quo in actions involving redhibitory 
defects,113 and that the articles on conventional obligations apply to 
redhibitory actions, the Court entered into a discussion of former 
article 1934 and current article 1998.114 
Perhaps the most important issue the Court discussed is 
whether “multiple objects” of an obligation are permitted under the 
new damage regime.115 The Court admitted that the Louisiana 
State Law Institute intended article 1998 to cover obligations 
involving mixed pecuniary and nonpecuniary objects—that is, the 
obligation does not need to have an exclusively nonpecuniary 
object to be within the contemplation of article 1998.116 Although 
not advocating Professor Litvinoff’s position that all contracts 
could trigger nonpecuniary damages depending on their nature, the 
                                                                                                             
 108. Id. at 1125 n.1. 
 109. Id. at 1125 & n.1. 
 110. Id. at 1124.  
 111. Id. at 1123. 
 112. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2531, 2545 (2015). 
 113. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2520 (2015). Civil Code article 2520 states:  
The seller warrants the buyer against redhibitory defects or vices, in the 
thing sold.  
A defect is redhibitory when it renders the thing useless, or its use so 
inconvenient that it must be presumed that a buyer would not have 
bought the thing had he known of the defect. The existence of such a 
defect gives a buyer the right to obtain rescission of the sale.  
A defect is redhibitory also when, without rendering the thing totally 
useless, it diminishes its usefulness or its value so that it must be 
presumed that a buyer would still have bought it but for a lesser price. 
The existence of such a defect limits the right of a buyer to a reduction 
of the price. 
Id. A redhibitory action is “[a]n action brought to void a sale of a thing 
having a defect that renders it either useless or so flawed that the buyer 
would not have bought it in the first place.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 36 
(9th ed. 2009). 
 114. Young, 595 So. 2d at 1130–34. 
 115. Id. at 1132. 
 116. Id. at 1131–32. 
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Court concluded that “[t]he only cases that would qualify for the 
recovery of this type of damages were those where the plaintiffs 
could show that they intended, at the time of contracting (and the 
nature of the contract supported such intention), to gratify a 
significant nonpecuniary interest.”117 Considering all of the above 
factors, the Court found this was not an appropriate case for 
nonpecuniary damages, as the purchase of a pick-up truck was not 
significantly nonpecuniary.118 The Court was unimpressed with the 
plaintiff’s claim that one reason the truck was purchased was 
because of the large cab area where he could lay down to ameliorate 
his back problems.119 According to the Court, this interest was 
merely “incidental” and not significantly nonpecuniary to warrant an 
award of damages under article 1998.120 
The Court’s reasoning for denying nonpecuniary damages, 
however, is flawed. The Court assumes that in order to avoid a “free 
for all,” which may have ensued under the Litvinoff regime, the 
Law Institute must have incorporated the “significant nonpecuniary 
interest” standard.121 It is true that the Institute was worried about an 
overly broad damage regime.122 In Meador, the Court made clear its 
preferred standard—that the nonpecuniary interest had to be the 
“principal object of the contract.”123 Instead of adopting this 
standard as a bar against the excessive use of nonpecuniary 
damages, the Legislature adopted an article that mentions absolutely 
nothing about a significant or principal object requirement.124 The 
drafters instead included another phrase to limit recovery—the 
opening phrase of article 1998, “when the contract, because of its 
nature.”125 
The results reached by the Court in Lafleur and Young could be 
explained by resort to this phrase. The natures126 of the contracts at 
issue in Lafleur and Young were to buy and sell a grain drill and a 
                                                                                                             
 117. Id. at 1132 (emphasis added). 
 118. Id. at 1133. 
 119. Id.  
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 1132–33. 
 122. Supplemental Memorandum on Damages for Nonpecuniary Losses, 
supra note 2, at 17–20. 
 123. Meador v. Toyota of Jefferson, Inc., 332 So. 2d 433, 438 (La. 1976) 
(emphasis added).  
 124. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1998 (2015). 
 125. See id. 
 126. Nature in this context is used to describe the qualities or characteristics 
of a contract. When the article speaks to looking at the “nature of the contract” 
and whether it was intended to satisfy a nonpecuniary interest, that was likely a 
reference to contracts whose nonpecuniary elements are immediately apparent.  
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pickup truck.127 Neither contract seems to be of the type that 
contemplates a nonpecuniary interest. The Court could have 
simply concluded that a breach of a contract for the purchase of a 
grain drill, or the sale of a truck, without further facts, does not 
support an award of nonpecuniary damages because the nature of 
these contracts, in the Court’s opinion, were not intended to gratify 
nonpecuniary interests.128 Although the plaintiffs in both Lafleur 
and Young introduced evidence of the existence of a nonpecuniary 
interest, the Court should have used the approach outlined in article 
1998 to conclude that either the nature of the obligation was not 
appropriate or that the contracts were not intended to satisfy a 
nonpecuniary interest.129 Using the actual text of the article to find 
the non-availability of damages would have been less of a departure 
from the true text of the Code. In Lafleur, former Chief Justice of 
the Louisiana Supreme Court Pascal Calogero stated that article 
1998 “serve[s] to clarify and make more certain under the law the 
Meador resolution.”130 Unfortunately, the clarity Justice Calogero 
hoped would follow the revision of article 1998 was never 
realized.131 
III. THE PROBLEM: ARTICLE 1998 SERVES AS A POOR GUIDE FOR 
NONPECUNIARY DAMAGE AWARDS IN LOUISIANA 
Pre-revision courts regularly denied nonpecuniary damages by 
determining that the contract at issue did not have principal or 
significant nonpecuniary objects or interests.132 The Louisiana 
Legislature, per the recommendation of the Louisiana State Law 
Institute, enacted article 1998 and eliminated any discussion of the 
object of the contract.133 The Institute hoped that such an 
elimination would prohibit judges from denying nonpecuniary 
damages in those cases where nonpecuniary elements were present 
but not central or principal.134  
                                                                                                             
 127. Young v. Ford Motor Co., 595 So. 2d 1123, 1124 (La. 1992); Lafleur v. 
John Deere Co., 491 So. 2d 624, 626 (La. 1986). 
 128. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1998 (2015). 
 129. As mentioned above, the facts of Lafleur arose in 1980 before the 
enactment of article 1998, so the Court correctly employed the Meador analysis. 
See Lafleur, 491 So. 2d at 629–30.  
 130. Id. at 629. See also Graphia, supra note 7, at 801.  
 131. See infra Part III.  
 132. This was most famously illustrated by Meador v. Toyota of Jefferson, 
Inc., 332 So. 2d 433, 437–38 (La. 1976). For a more detailed discussion, see 
supra Part I.B. 
 133. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1998 (2015).  
 134. In the Supplemental Memorandum on Damages for Nonpecuniary 
Losses prepared by Louisiana Law Institute Staff Attorney Alejandro Garro for 
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Unfortunately, the Institute chose to replace “object” with a 
fairly obscure standard—one that refers to the “nature” of the 
contract.135 The confusion that resulted is not surprising given the 
similar definitions of “nature” and “object.”136 Both of these 
concepts shift the focus from the harm or injury felt by the obligee 
to the conduct of the obligor. However, even if the “nature” of a 
contract may not point toward nonpecuniary elements, it is still 
possible for an obligee to suffer nonpecuniary loss.137 Overcoming 
the “nature of the contract” hurdle has proven to be a difficult task 
for litigants and one that seems unnecessary as long as nonpecuniary 
loss is proven. To this point, the Institute acknowledged that “the 
expression ‘nature of the contract’ amounts to a timid change in an 
area where the commendable policy is to allow recovery of 
‘nonpecuniary damages’ according to the effects of the 
nonperformance and not to the ‘nature,’ ‘purpose,’ or ‘object’ of the 
contract.”138  
Although the statement above is evidence of the Louisiana State 
Law Institute’s support for the availability of nonpecuniary 
damages “according to the effects of the nonperformance and not 
to the ‘nature,’ ‘purpose’ or ‘object’ of the contract,” the Louisiana 
Supreme Court’s application of article 1998 has not embodied this 
policy.139 Instead, the Court merely borrowed the old Meador 
standard that required a “principal or significant nonpecuniary 
                                                                                                             
 
the Obligations Committee Meeting on July 25, 1980, he stated: “Under the new 
approach, recovery of ‘non-pecuniary damages’ is not linked to a deprivation of 
‘intellectual enjoyment,’ nor to the particular ‘object’ of the contract. No doubt 
that this kind of change will be welcomed by those who supported a more liberal 
interpretation of Article 1934(3).” Supplemental Memorandum on Damages for 
Nonpecuniary Losses, supra note 2, at 31.  
 135. Id. at 33. See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 1998 (2015). 
 136. The Committee described the term “object” as the “expectation of the 
contracting parties at the time they entered into the agreement.” Supplemental 
Memorandum on Damages for Nonpecuniary Losses, supra note 2, at 24. The 
Law Institute described the term “nature” as what the contracting parties 
intended the contract to gratify. See Louisiana State Law Institute, July 27, 1979, 
supra note 43, at 6.  
 137. See, e.g., Young v. Ford Motor Co., 595 So. 2d 1123 (La. 1992). The 
contract at issue was for the purchase of a vehicle, which is likely pecuniary in 
nature. Id. at 1124. However, the plaintiff was still able to put on evidence of 
nonpecuniary losses—namely, the loss of his vehicle to participate in 
recreational fishing and the selection of that particular vehicle to lay down and 
rest his aching back. Id. at 1125. 
 138. Supplemental Memorandum on Damages for Nonpecuniary Losses, 
supra note 2, at 33. 
 139. See id.; see, e.g., Meador v. Toyota of Jefferson, Inc., 332 So. 2d 433 
(La. 1976).  
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object” and applied it now as a requirement under article 1998—by 
reading the article to require a “principal or significant nonpecuniary 
interest.”140 Although at first glance it seems that article 1998 would 
make major changes to the landscape of Louisiana jurisprudence, if 
anything it has ushered in more confusion. It is time for the 
Legislature to once again consider a revision of article 1998 to 
finally clarify an area of the law that has suffered from enormous 
obscurity.  
A. Comparative Approach 
During the 1985 revision, the Louisiana State Law Institute 
looked to both civilian and common law jurisdictions to draw 
influence for the Louisiana nonpecuniary damage regime. 
1. Civilian Comparison 
When the Louisiana State Law Institute proposed article 1998, it 
cited several civilian jurisdictions that have legislation or doctrine 
regarding damages for nonpecuniary loss, such as Argentina,141 
Switzerland,142 Quebec,143 Germany,144 and France.145 Article 1998 
                                                                                                             
 140. See Meador, 332 So. 2d at 437–38. 
 141. See Louisiana State Law Institute, July 27, 1979, supra note 43, at 5; 
CÓD. CIV. art. 522 (Arg.) (“In case of breach of contract, the court may grant 
recovery for the moral damages sustained by the obligee, according to the 
circumstances giving rise to the obligor’s liability.”).  
 142. See Louisiana State Law Institute, July 27, 1979, supra note 43, at 5 
(citing CODE DES OBLIGATIONS, [CO] [Code of Obligations] art. 49, 99 
(Switz.)). Article 99 of this Code provides that the rules governing recovery on 
grounds of quasi-delict are applicable to recovery for breach of conventional 
obligations. Under article 49, nonpecuniary damages are recoverable in quasi-
delict. The Law Institute discussed in detail the Swiss approach to nonpecuniary 
harm, which is conceptually similar to the French dommage moral. Supplemental 
Memorandum on Damages for Nonpecuniary Losses, supra note 2, at 4. 
 143. See Louisiana State Law Institute, July 27, 1979, supra note 43, at 5 
(citing Quebec Report 1975 art. 274 (“All prejudice to reparation may be 
material or moral.”)); see also Civil Code of Quebec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, art. 1458 
(Can.) (“Every person has a duty to honour his contractual undertakings. Where 
he fails in this duty, he is liable for any bodily, moral or material injury he 
causes to the other contracting party and is bound to make reparation for the 
injury; neither he nor the other party may in such a case avoid the rules 
governing contractual liability by opting for rules that would be more favourable 
to them.”).  
 144. See Supplemental Memorandum on Damages for Nonpecuniary Losses, 
supra note 2, at 5; see also BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], 
Jan. 2, 2002, BUNDESGESETZBLATT 42, as amended, § 253 (Ger.). 
 145. See Supplemental Memorandum on Damages for Nonpecuniary Losses, 
supra note 2, at 8. 
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was drawn largely from legislation in these jurisdictions, which 
reflects a willingness to compensate for nonpecuniary harm. 
Germany, infamous for its abundance of positive law, has spelled 
out specific circumstances for which nonpecuniary damages are 
available.146  
In France, although not having any positive legislation 
governing nonpecuniary damages in the Code Napoléon, the 
availability of such damages is recognized doctrinally.147 Article 
1149, the general article on damages in the French Code Civil, has 
not been interpreted to restrict damages for nonpecuniary loss, 
known by the French as dommage moral.148 Unlike the current 
state of Louisiana law, recovery of dommage moral is dependent 
on the effects of the breach, rather than the object of the contract.149 
Professor Litvinoff’s proposal in the revision discussion accurately 
reflects the “effects-based” French approach.150 Louisiana should 
embrace the damage-based approach used by other civilian 
jurisdictions to expand the availability of nonpecuniary damages. 
2. Common Law Comparison  
Louisiana’s hesitance to embrace a damage regime that fully 
compensates for nonpecuniary injuries may stem from the strong 
influence of surrounding common law jurisdictions in the United 
States. The common law has not widely embraced the availability 
of nonpecuniary damages in breach of contract actions.151 A 
renowned expert on common law contracts, Samuel Williston, 
wrote: 
Mental suffering caused by a breach of contract . . . is not 
generally considered as a basis for compensation in 
contractual actions. There are, however, exceptions to this 
rule in a number of jurisdictions . . . only where the breach 
also causes bodily harm or the nature of the contract is such 
that a breach of it is likely to result in serious emotional 
disturbance. It has also been stated where other than 
pecuniary benefits are contracted for, damages have been 
allowed for injury to a person’s feelings.152 
                                                                                                             
 146. Id. at 9.  
 147. Id. at 8. See supra Part I.A. 
 148. See Supplemental Memorandum on Damages for Nonpecuniary Losses, 
supra note 2, at 8. 
 149. Id.  
 150. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.  
 151. WILLISTON, supra note 19, § 64:7. 
 152. Id.  
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Similarly, Section 353 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
states: “Recovery for emotional disturbance will be excluded 
unless the breach also caused bodily harm or the contract or the 
breach is of such a kind that serious emotional disturbance was a 
particularly likely result.”153 
Both of these excerpts show a greater focus on the intent of the 
obligor who failed to perform, rather than on the type of loss felt by 
the obligee. Additionally, these excerpts show a punitive element, 
which is not present in the Louisiana legislation.154  
Part of the confusion present in Louisiana stems largely from 
how to characterize the type of contract and the parties’ 
expectations. An easier approach, advocated by Professor Litvinoff, 
would be to award damages for nonpecuniary loss when incurred, 
regardless of the nature of the contract and with less emphasis on the 
behavior of the obligor.155 When asked in an Obligations Committee 
meeting whether Louisiana should adopt a framework that would 
award nonpecuniary damages only for physical injury to persons, 
like the Restatement, Litvinoff responded in the negative.156 
Louisiana courts associate bodily harm with delicts, a different 
source of liability in the civil law, where damages for mental 
anguish and pain and suffering are common.157  
Like Louisiana, other states have struggled to develop case law 
to handle damages for mental distress in breach of contract 
actions.158 The result of these efforts has been varied.159 In 1881, 
                                                                                                             
 153. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 (1981). 
 154. Supplemental Memorandum on Damages for Nonpecuniary Losses, 
supra note 2, at 8. The Restatement permits damages for mental suffering when 
the damage rises to the level of bodily harm. This reflects a common-law policy 
that not all nonpecuniary harm is compensable. The fact that damages are 
available after bodily harm is inflicted is likely aimed more at punishing the 
individual who breached the contract and less at repairing nonpecuniary harm.  
 155. Louisiana State Law Institute, Minutes of the Meeting of the Council at 
122 (June 1981) (on file with the Louisiana State Law Institute) [hereinafter 
June Minutes]. 
 156. Id. at 125.  
 157. See Dane S. Ciolino, Recent Case, Lafleur v. John Deere Co.: Recovery 
of Nonpecuniary Damages in Redhibitory Actions, 61 TUL. L. REV. 704, 705–06 
(1987); see also CRAWFORD, supra note 17, § 18.2. 
 158. Andre Keith Sanders, Comment, Brown v. Fitz: A Further Restriction 
on the Recovery of Damages for Emotional Distress Arising out of Breach of 
Contract, 14 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 203, 203–05 (1990).  
 159. Id. See, e.g., B & M Homes, Inc., v. Hogan, 376 So. 2d 667, 671 (Ala. 
1979) (discussing the general rule prohibiting damages for mental anguish with 
several extraordinary exceptions); Jankowski v. Mazzotta, 152 N.W.2d 49, 51 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1967) (“Recovery for such mental anguish, however, has been 
properly circumscribed within rather narrow limits by the precedents and rules 
of law applicable in Michigan.”); S. Miss. v. Williams, 891 So. 2d 160, 172 
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Texas became the first state to allow damages for mental anguish 
in breach of contract actions without other claims and damages.160 
In So-Relle v. Western Union Telegraph Co., the court awarded 
damages for mental anguish where the defendant telegraph company 
delayed sending the plaintiff a message about his mother’s death, 
thereby prohibiting him from attending her funeral.161 The Texas 
court found that the damages for emotional distress were easily 
foreseeable because such distress would expectedly result from the 
death of a loved one.162 The Texas court overruled itself two years 
later and then readopted its original position in 1885.163  
Similarly in 1967, the California Supreme Court awarded 
damages for emotional distress for the breach of an insurance policy 
in Crisci v. Security Insurance Co.164 According to the court, the 
plaintiff purchased her insurance policy for peace of mind and 
security, not to obtain a commercial advantage.165 Remarkably, the 
court stated that damages for emotional distress were foreseeable 
because of the insurance contract’s personal nature.166  
Only 30 years later, the California Supreme Court in Erlich v. 
Menezes was faced with an action for negligent breach of a 
contract to construct a home.167 The plaintiffs contracted with the 
defendant to build their dream home on an ocean-view lot.168 After 
                                                                                                             
 
(Miss. 2004) (discussing the availability of emotional distress damages in breach 
of contract cases, the court stated, “It is now undisputed that under Mississippi 
law a plaintiff can assert a claim for mental anguish and emotional distress in a 
breach of contract action. However, our decisions over the past several years 
addressing mental anguish and emotional distress are arguably unclear.” 
(internal citations omitted)). 
 160. Sanders, supra note 158, at 209. 
 161. C. O. So Relle v. W. Union Tel. Co., 55 Tex. 308, 311, 313–14 (Tex. 
1881).  
 162. Id. at 312. 
 163. See Stuart v. W. Union Tel. Co., 66 Tex. 580 (Tex. 1885); Gulf, C. & 
Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Levy, 59 Tex. 563 (Tex. 1883); see also Comment, 5 CAL. 
W. L. REV. 88, 91 (1968).  
 164. See Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967); Sanders, supra 
note 158, at 213. 
 165. Crisci, 426 P.2d at 179. 
 166. Id. Contrast this with Louisiana, where nonpecuniary damages in breach 
of contract actions are supposed to be more readily available. In fact, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court has specifically stated that an insurance policy that 
covered the plaintiff’s home was “not designed to gratify nonpecuniary 
interests.” Sher v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 988 So. 2d 186, 202 (La. 2008). Rather, 
the Court concluded that the policy was “meant to protect pecuniary interests.” 
Id.  
 167. Erlich v. Menezes, 981 P.2d 978 (Cal. 1999). 
 168. Id. 
1298 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75 
 
 
 
moving into their new home, the plaintiffs experienced rain that 
left them with a house that “leaked from every conceivable 
location,” even after attempts to patch leaks, which made the 
damage worse.169 After an inspection by another general 
contractor, the plaintiffs learned that there were defects not only in 
their roof but also in the stucco, windows, waterproofing, and 
structure, causing the near-collapse of the home.170 The couple was 
so distraught by the defects in their home that the husband had to be 
rushed away in an ambulance.171 Additionally, the wife’s emotional 
distress led her to install special emergency lights on their 
daughter’s window so rescue personnel would find her first in the 
event of an emergency.172 The trial court awarded the plaintiffs 
$50,000 each for emotional distress, and this damage award was 
affirmed on appeal.173 The California Court of Appeals subsequently 
reversed the award of damages, stating that “[n]o California case has 
allowed recovery for emotional distress arising solely out of 
property damage.”174 The court in Erlich indicated that “unless the 
defendant has assumed a duty to plaintiff in which the emotional 
condition of the plaintiff is an object,” recovery of emotional 
distress damages will be unlikely.175  
The cases above illustrate the varied and unpredictable 
approaches taken by courts grappling with emotional distress 
damages. Although damages for emotional distress and mental 
anguish may be recoverable in some instances, it is certainly not the 
norm in common-law states.176 Additionally, one scholar has 
described the law governing “non-economic damages” as 
“disorganized and contradictory at best.”177 Louisiana is consistently 
cited as one jurisdiction where the law appears relatively liberal.178 
                                                                                                             
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 981. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 981–82. 
 174. Id. at 985.  
 175. Id. 
 176. “The limiting rules and so-called guidelines adopted by modern American 
courts regarding the recoverability of non-economic damages in breach of contract 
actions are disorganized and contradictory at best.” Mara Kent, The Common-Law 
History of Non-Economic Damages in Breach of Contract Actions Versus Willful 
Breach of Contract Actions, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 481, 482 (2005). 
 177. Id.  
 178. See, e.g., id. at 501 (citing Lewis v. Holmes, 34 So. 66 (La. 1903); Pike 
v. Stephens Imports Inc., 448 So. 2d 738 (La. Ct. App. 1984)); see also Ronnie 
Cohen & Shannon O’Byrne, Cry Me a River: Recovery of Mental Distress 
Damages in a Breach of Contract Action—A North American Perspective, 42 
AM. BUS. L.J. 97, 112, 127–28 (2005) (citing several Louisiana cases for their 
approach on emotional distress, such as Harvey v. Dietzen, 716 So. 2d. 911 (La. 
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Yet, even Louisiana has not been spared from decades of 
unpredictable jurisprudence.179 This further highlights the need for 
a clearer, more effective analysis regarding damages for 
nonpecuniary loss so Louisiana can serve as a model to lead the 
way in nonpecuniary damage legislation.  
IV. A CALL FOR REVISION: REVIVING PROFESSOR LITVINOFF’S 
DAMAGE-BASED APPROACH  
Despite the Civil Code’s mandate, courts have inconsistently 
applied article 1998, much to the disdain of litigants and scholars. 
On January 1, 1985, article 1998 replaced former article 1934(3) to 
become the new legislation governing nonpecuniary damages.180 
Although the drafters intended to create clarity, there remains 
significant uncertainty regarding the availability of nonpecuniary 
damages in Louisiana breach of contract actions. Both the 
construction and interpretation of article 1998, as well as policy 
considerations, have contributed to this uncertainty. The problem 
the Law Institute originally hoped to address can be summed up by 
reference to a report prepared by the Obligations Committee: “The 
right to recover ‘nonpecuniary damages’ should not depend upon 
the ‘contractual object’ nor upon the ‘overriding concern’ of the 
contracting parties; it should depend upon the existence of the 
nonpecuniary harm and the casual nexum between the breach and 
the harm.”181 
A. Considerations for a Revised Article 1998 
When contemplating revisions to former article 1934, the 
Louisiana State Law Institute considered fewer restrictions on the 
availability of nonpecuniary damages but ultimately decided on the 
current article.182 It is possible the Committee thought courts 
would analyze article 1998 de novo. In reality, Louisiana courts did 
                                                                                                             
 
1998), Taylor v. Burton, 708 So. 2d 531 (La. 1998), and Vick v. National 
Airlines, Inc., 409 So. 2d 383 (La. Ct. App. 1982)). 
 179. See supra Parts I–II. 
 180. See Act No. 331, 1984 La. Acts 156.  
 181. Supplemental Memorandum on Damages for Nonpecuniary Losses, 
supra note 2, at 25.  
 182. For five proposed articles the Obligations Revision Committee 
considered adopting as article 1998, see Louisiana State Law Institute, 
Supplemental Memorandum on Damages for Nonpecuniary Losses, Prepared 
for the Meeting of Council (Sept. 18, 1981) (on file with the Louisiana State 
Law Institute).  
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not depart from the pre-revision jurisprudence.183 Another potential 
reason the Law Institute adopted this article may be because it 
thought the article reflected the best compromise of all competing 
interests. These interests include the purpose behind awarding 
nonpecuniary damages, the fear that nonpecuniary damages may 
turn into punitive damages, a convolution of the law of delicts and 
the law of obligations, the approach taken by other states, and the 
“multiple object” debate the Louisiana Supreme Court grappled 
with in Meador v. Toyota of Jefferson.184 Although the Law 
Institute properly considered all of these factors, it ultimately 
produced legislation that furthered the confusion present in the 
jurisprudence and scholarly commentaries. Accordingly, the 
Louisiana State Law Institute should reconsider the policy 
considerations and competing interests to amend article 1998 and 
create a workable nonpecuniary damage regime.  
1. Reasons for Reparation 
A new damages law must consider what values drive an award 
of nonpecuniary damages in a breach of contract action. If 
damages are awarded to repair all injured interests within reason, 
then nonpecuniary damages should be available as a remedy when, 
regardless of the nature of the contract, any nonpecuniary interest 
has been injured.185 The Obligations Committee considered how to 
measure damages when the harm suffered by the obligee is 
exclusively moral.186 This type of situation could arise where there 
is a breach of contract and there is no pecuniary harm suffered. 
The modern trend is to allow damages for nonpecuniary recovery 
only where there is also a pecuniary claim, rendering the 
“exclusively moral” situation above virtually non-compensable.187 
However, coupling a nonpecuniary loss with even the slightest 
pecuniary loss may give the finder of fact security that there is 
some degree of certainty in the harm felt. Only seldom will there 
                                                                                                             
 183. See supra text accompanying note 130 for Chief Justice Calogero’s 
statement post-revision that article 1998 “serve[s] to clarify and make more 
certain under the law the Meador resolution of the pertinent legal issue under the 
former article 1934(3).” Lafleur v. John Deere Co., 491 So. 2d 624, 629 (La. 
1986). 
 184. Meador v. Toyota of Jefferson, Inc., 332 So. 2d 433 (La. 1976). 
 185. Litvinoff, Moral Damages, supra note 5, at 3. 
 186. Supplemental Memorandum on Damages for Nonpecuniary Losses, 
supra note 2, at 1. This is why the few common law jurisdictions that 
contemplate damages for mental anguish in breach of contract cases often 
require that it accompany an independent tort. Cohen & O’Byrne, supra note 
178, at 113.  
 187. Litvinoff, Moral Damages, supra note 5, at 4. 
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be breach of contract actions where absolutely no pecuniary harm 
is felt. Thus, imposing this requirement would rarely cause distress 
for many litigants. In the alternative, allowing judges to use 
discretion in awarding damages for nonpecuniary loss would be a 
better way to ensure fairness to all litigants. Judges would then still 
be at liberty to award nonpecuniary damages, even when an 
obligee suffers an exclusively nonpecuniary loss in extreme 
circumstances.188 
2. Avoidance of Excessive Punitive Damages 
Because damages for nonpecuniary loss are often not 
susceptible of precise measurement, the Obligations Committee 
was concerned that they may become punitive in nature.189 This 
concern stems from Louisiana’s general dislike of punitive 
damages.190 The Court in Young v. Ford Motor Co. pointed to the 
apparent rejection by the Obligations Committee of an article that 
would allow nonpecuniary damages in every kind of contract for 
“fear of opening the door to punitive damage awards.”191 Punitive 
damages are largely a common law concept,192 available in 
                                                                                                             
 188. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1999 (2015). For example, a British couple 
recovered damages for emotional distress in a breach of contract action against 
their wedding videographer who failed to capture their most cherished moments. 
Jaya Narain, Is This The World’s Worst Wedding Video? Cameraman Who 
Filmed Backs of Heads, Grass and People Who Weren’t Even Attending 
Ordered to Pay Compensation, MAIL ONLINE (Mar. 21, 2011, 10:49), http: 
//www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-1368143/Wedding-videographer-ordered- 
pay-compensation-dreadful-350-video.html, archived at http://perma.cc/LV3Q-
B8NM. 
 189. Supplemental Memorandum on Damages for Nonpecuniary Losses, 
supra note 2, at 5. See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 1995 (2015) (Measure of 
Damages: “Damages are measured by the loss sustained by the obligee and the 
profit of which he has been deprived.”). When compared to damages for 
nonpecuniary loss, this article provides a greater degree of certainty in what 
quantities and criteria for measurement are relevant.  
 190. For more information about punitive damages in Louisiana, see 
Brooksie L. Bonvillain, Comment, Slaying the Trojan Horse: Arabie v. Citgo 
and Punitive Damages under Louisiana’s Conflict-of-Laws Provisions, 74 LA. 
L. REV. 327, 330 (2013) (discussing Louisiana’s “strong legislative policy 
against awarding punitive damages, except in limited statutorily excepted 
situations”). See also John W. deGravelles & Neale deGravelles, Louisiana 
Punitive Damages—A Conflict of Traditions, 70 LA. L. REV. 579 (2010). 
 191. Young v. Ford Motor Co., 595 So. 2d 1123, 1131 (citing June Minutes, 
supra note 155, at 8–11).  
 192. Supplemental Memorandum on Damages for Nonpecuniary Losses, 
supra note 2, at 5.  
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Louisiana only in extraordinary circumstances.193 Punitive 
damages are inconsistent with Louisiana’s civil law system which 
values compensation to make the aggrieved whole again and to 
repair the loss.194 Thus, Louisiana’s general prohibition on punitive 
damages is consistent with the civil law’s contempt for damages 
designed to inflict punishment.195 Some members of the 
Obligations Committee and the Louisiana Supreme Court were 
worried that a very broad approach to nonpecuniary damages 
would result in abuse by litigants and a “back-door” approach to 
punitive damages.196 The following short excerpt from the 
Obligations Revision Committee meeting minutes reflects this 
concern: 
Truman Woodward: I believe that the Council is ready to 
overrule Meador but only to an extent that we do not open 
the door to punitive and other forms of damages.  
Frank Middleton: There ain’t no way. If we overrule 
Meador, we will open the door to other forms of 
damages.197  
To award nonpecuniary damages to every obligee who suffers 
mental distress from an obligor’s nonperformance may appear 
somewhat punitive.198 Despite this appearance, these damages are 
not intended to punish; rather, they merely compensate for a 
legitimate loss incurred by the plaintiff.199 In the hypothetical 
involving the wine owner’s destroyed wine collection,200 awarding 
nonpecuniary damages would be far from punitive—the damages 
would instead compensate for the loss of a special family 
collection sustained as a result of the obligor’s nonperformance. 
Louisiana’s commitment to allowing punitive damages in only the 
most extreme circumstances may be one reason why the Louisiana 
Supreme Court has been hesitant to read article 1998 liberally and 
allow recovery in more cases. As a result, article 1998 should be 
                                                                                                             
 193. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315.3 (2015) (providing for exemplary 
damages in certain cases involving child pornography); LA. CIV. CODE art. 
2315.4 (2015) (providing for exemplary damages in certain cases involving the 
intoxicated operation of a motor vehicle).  
 194. Supplemental Memorandum on Damages for Nonpecuniary Losses, 
supra note 2, at 6. 
 195. Id. (“The idea of punishment is totally foreign to the civil law . . . .”).  
 196. Young, 595 So. 2d at 1131 (citing June Minutes, supra note 155).  
 197. June Minutes, supra note 155, at 11–12.  
 198. See A.L. Barton, Young v. Ford Motor Co.: Contorts—Nonpecuniary 
Damages in Redhibitory Actions, 67 TUL. L. REV. 336, 344 (1992).  
 199. Supplemental Memorandum on Damages for Nonpecuniary Losses, 
supra note 2, at 6. 
 200. See supra Part I. 
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revised to emphasize the distinction between nonpecuniary damages 
and punitive damages. This aim could be easily achieved by adding 
commentary to article 1998 stating the drafters’ intention to leave 
the law surrounding punitive damages untouched and clarifying that 
nonpecuniary damages are not punitive in nature but are instead 
meant to compensate for nonpecuniary loss. Additionally, a 
provision allowing for judicial discretion would encourage judges to 
exercise caution about claims that appear “punitive.” 
3. Distinctions Between the Laws of Obligation and Delict 
A third policy consideration for an amended nonpecuniary 
damages article concerns the law of delicts.201 It is well-settled that 
delictual conduct gives rise to a claim of damages for mental and 
emotional distress, pain and suffering, and other nonpecuniary 
damages.202 Historically, these damages have always been 
available in tort with little or no availability in contract.203 
However, because article 1998 clearly states that nonpecuniary 
damages are available in nonperformance of contract actions under 
certain circumstances, there is less of a reason to draw such 
distinctions between these two areas of law in the damages 
context.204 It is not equitable to allow lesser damages for a plaintiff 
who was the victim of a breach of contract that injured a 
nonpecuniary interest merely because the action sounded in 
contract rather than tort. This was the principal argument of Justice 
Dixon in his dissent in Meador.205 Professor Litvinoff relied 
                                                                                                             
 201. In Louisiana, wrongful conduct is often called a “delict” as opposed to a 
tort. Louisiana Civil Code article 2315 (2015) is the primary article governing 
delictual liability. The article states: 
A. Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges 
him by whose fault it happened to repair it.   
B. Damages may include loss of consortium, service and society, and 
shall be recoverable by the same respective categories of persons 
who would have had a cause of action for wrongful death of an 
injured person. Damages do not include costs for future medical 
treatment, services, surveillance, or procedures of any kind unless 
such treatment, services, surveillance or procedures are directly 
related to a manifest physical or mental injury or disease. Damages 
shall include any sales taxes paid by the owner on the repair or 
replacement of the property damaged.  
LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315 (2015).  
 202. Supplemental Memorandum on Damages for Nonpecuniary Losses, 
supra note 2, at 28.  
 203. LITVINOFF, supra note 3, § 6.7, at 163.  
 204. Id. at 164.  
 205. Meador v. Toyota of Jefferson, Inc., 332 So. 2d 433, 438–39 (La. 1976) 
(Dixon, J., dissenting).  
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heavily on Justice Dixon’s position, stating: “I want to overturn 
Meador v. Toyota. I have relied upon Justice Dixon’s dissent in 
Meador. I don’t believe that there is any reason for not allowing 
recovery for nonpecuniary damages in contractual cases.”206 
Perhaps the hard line between damages in tort and contract is 
no longer necessary. For example, the Hawaii Supreme Court 
formulated a unique solution to damages for emotional distress in 
breach of contract actions.207 In Dold v. Outrigger, the defendant 
hotel did not provide hotel rooms to the plaintiff after it contracted 
to do so.208 The Hawaii Supreme Court awarded the plaintiffs 
damages for emotional distress based on the defendant’s consistent 
overbooking.209 The Hawaii Supreme Court fashioned this remedy 
for emotional distress in a breach of contract action, calling it “a 
fusion of the doctrines of tort and contract.”210  
Eight years later, the Hawaii Supreme Court awarded damages 
to a restaurant operator in Chung v. Kaonohi Center Co., after the 
defendant shopping mall owner misrepresented the availability of a 
lease.211 The plaintiffs spent a significant amount of money in 
reliance on the availability of the lease.212 The Hawaii Supreme 
Court held that, despite the clearly commercial nature of this 
contract, the “wanton and reckless nature of the breach” justified 
an award of damages for emotional distress.213 Again, the Hawaii 
Supreme Court had no qualms about designating certain conduct 
so offensive that it gives rise to tort liability, even though it 
occurred in the context of a breach of contract claim.214  
The Hawaii Supreme Court likely engaged in the fusing of two 
well-established, yet distinct, areas of law to satisfy its desire to 
repair injuries suffered by the plaintiffs. Although these cases have 
been viewed negatively by more recent cases, they are examples of 
judicial desperation to fashion a remedy that will adequately 
compensate plaintiffs.215 Clarifying the law surrounding 
nonpecuniary damages would solve that problem, which may be 
                                                                                                             
 206. June Minutes, supra note 155, at 1.  
 207. Sanders, supra note 158, at 214.  
 208. Dold v. Outrigger, 501 P.2d 368, 370 (Haw. 1972). 
 209. Id. at 372. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Chung v. Kaonohi Ctr. Co., 618 P.2d 283 (Haw. 1980).  
 212. Id. at 286. 
 213. Id. at 289. 
 214. Id.  
 215. See Francis v. Lee Enters., Inc., 971 P.2d 707 (Haw. 1999) (abrogating 
Chung and Dold).  
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common to many courts—merely awarding punitive damages 
because there is no other option to compensate the plaintiff.216  
However, the strong policy interest in keeping tort and contract 
recovery separate is embedded in the very root of the tort and 
contract doctrines themselves. Claims for breach of contract 
presuppose that judges will look to the intent of the parties—which 
is why damages in contract depend on their “foreseeability.”217 For 
this reason, foreseeability stands as the strongest argument against 
a less-restrictive nonpecuniary damage regime.218 
4. Foreseeability as a Limit to Nonpecuniary Damages  
Generally, damages in breach of contract actions are limited to 
those that arise naturally “according to the usual course of things, 
from such breach of contract itself,” or those that are known to the 
parties and are thus contemplated.219 Louisiana has accepted and 
codified this general rule of foreseeability into Civil Code articles 
1996 and 1997.220 Article 1996 governs obligors in good faith and 
holds them liable only for damages foreseeable at the time the 
contract was formed.221 In contrast, article 1997 holds obligors in 
bad faith liable for all damages, foreseeable or not, as long as they 
are a direct consequence of the obligor’s breach.222 Articles 1996 
                                                                                                             
 216. See, e.g., Hibschman Pontiac, Inc. v. Batchelor, 362 N.E. 2d 845 (Ind. 
1977). Hibschman was cited by Professor Litvinoff for the proposition that “the 
common law intended to grant recovery for the ‘moral damage’ sustained by the 
carowner [sic] but, for the lack of a better instrument had to resort to the 
‘punitive damages’ instead.” Id. 
 217. See Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). The Hadley court 
famously articulated the rule of foreseeability: 
Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken, 
the damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such 
breach of contract should be as may fairly and reasonably be considered 
as either arising naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of things, 
from such breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be 
supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time 
they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it.  
Id. at 151. 
 218. See Bloomfield, supra note 52, at 556. In discussing the effect of 
foreseeability on contractual damages, Bloomfield stated: “[I]f an obligor were 
faced with nonpecuniary damage liability when nonpecuniary interests were not 
intended to be served by the contract, unfairness, overdeterrence and a 
fundamental inconsistency with the theory of contracts would result.” Id.  
 219. HOWARD O. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS § 14:10, Foreseeability 
of Damages—General and Special Damages: Hadley v. Baxendale (3d ed. 2013). 
 220. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1996–1997 (2015).  
 221. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1996 (2015).  
 222. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1997 (2015).  
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and 1997, when read in pari materia with article 1998, act as a 
limit on nonpecuniary damages.223  
The foreseeability principle is also incorporated directly into 
article 1998.224 The first paragraph includes the phrase “because of 
the circumstances surrounding the formation or the 
nonperformance of the contract, the obligor knew, or should have 
known, that his failure to perform would cause that kind of 
loss.”225 In situations where the obligor has knowledge of the 
special, nonpecuniary circumstances surrounding the obligation, 
the obligee’s nonpecuniary loss will have been both foreseeable 
and a direct consequence.226 Additionally, article 1998 contains a 
reference to the obligor’s knowledge of nonpecuniary interests at 
the time of the nonperformance.227 Thus, the damage expectancy at 
the formation of the contract is not the only inquiry; rather, if an 
obligor in good faith was aware of the nonpecuniary interest at 
either the formation of the contract or the nonperformance, then 
nonpecuniary damages are foreseeable and appropriate.228  
Under former article 1934, Professor Litvinoff considered 
another way that the obligor’s breach may give rise to nonpecuniary 
damages: if the breach is surrounded by circumstances such that 
“the obligor cannot ignore that some form of mental suffering will 
result for the obligee.”229 This can best be summarized by the 
manner in which the breach occurred and the surrounding 
circumstances of the breach.230 This method of recovery is also 
incorporated into article 1998 in both the first paragraph and 
potentially the second paragraph.231 This situation will often involve 
                                                                                                             
 223. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 13 (2015) (“Laws on the same subject matter 
must be interpreted in reference to each other.”); see also Barbara J. Van 
Arsdale, Tracy Bateman Farrell, & Tom Muskus, § Provisions in pari materia, 
73 AM. JUR. 2d Statutes § 95 (2013). The term “in pari materia” means that 
pieces of legislation should be read together in context to interpret their 
meaning, even if there is not an explicit reference to the other legislation. Id.  
 224. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1998 (2015).  
 225. Id. 
 226. Litvinoff, Moral Damages, supra note 5, at 24.  
 227. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1998 (2015). Nonperformance of an obligation is 
the civilian equivalent of common law breach of contract. See LA. CIV. CODE 
art. 1757 (2015).  
 228. Litvinoff, Moral Damages, supra note 5, at 24. 
 229. Id. at 25. See, e.g., Vogel v. Saenger Theatres, 22 So. 2d 189 (La. 1945). 
In Saenger, the Louisiana Supreme Court awarded the plaintiff damages for 
mental distress as a result of the obligor’s failure to allow them into the movie 
theatre. Id. at 192. The Court found the plaintiff’s physical condition hinged on 
the “kind and character” of the elements surrounding the obligor’s breach. Id.  
 230. Litvinoff, Moral Damages, supra note 5, at 25–26.  
 231. Louisiana Civil Code article 1998 provides that:  
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a bad faith obligor, who would be liable for all damages regardless 
of their foreseeability, as long as they are a direct consequence of 
the nonperformance.232  
The principle of foreseeability incorporated in article 1998 
should comfort courts because obligors who are not apprised of 
nonpecuniary elements of a contract cannot, under the current law, 
be held liable for nonpecuniary losses unless their nonperformance 
occurred in bad faith. 
5. Clarification on the Second Paragraph of Article 1998 
The second paragraph of article 1998 states: “Regardless of the 
nature of the contract, these damages may be recovered also when the 
obligor intended, through his failure, to aggrieve the feelings of the 
obligee.”233 This paragraph provides a loose and subjective standard 
for which nonpecuniary damages are available. It appears this 
standard would be easier to meet than the onerous “significance” 
requirement jurisprudentially imposed on the first paragraph. 
However, cases that cite this part of the article are few and far 
between.  
Comment (d) to article 1998 states that an obligee may recover 
damages for nonpecuniary loss when the “obligor fails to perform in 
circumstances that give rise to the presumption that the obligee’s 
embarrassment or humiliation was intended by the obligor.”234 This 
comment encompasses Professor Litvinoff’s idea that the manner of 
the breach may warrant nonpecuniary damages.235 Whether comment 
(d) is meant to apply to the “feelings” aspect of the second paragraph 
of article 1998 is not certain. The relationship between the second 
paragraph and bad faith obligees is also unsettled. The “feelings” 
standard, with more detail, could be a viable option for litigants to 
recover nonpecuniary damages when needed. 
                                                                                                             
 
Damages for nonpecuniary loss may be recovered when the contract, 
because of its nature, is intended to gratify a nonpecuniary interest and, 
because of the circumstances surrounding the formation or the 
nonperformance of the contract, the obligor knew, or should have 
known, that his failure to perform would cause that kind of loss. 
Regardless of the nature of the contract, these damages may be 
recovered also when the obligor intended, through his failure, to 
aggrieve the feelings of the obligee. 
LA. CIV. CODE art. 1998 (2015).  
 232. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1997 (2015).  
 233. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1998 (2015).  
 234. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1998 cmt. d (2015).  
 235. Litvinoff, Moral Damages, supra note 5, at 24–26.  
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The court’s reticence in applying the second paragraph is 
understandable. The article gives no indication to what degree the 
feelings of the obligee need to be aggrieved, or what it means to 
intend to aggrieve.236 In the case of intentional breach of contract, 
does the mere awareness by the obligor that the feelings of the 
obligee may be aggrieved by the obligor’s nonperformance mean 
the same thing as intending to aggrieve them? In Aucoin v. Southern 
Quality Homes, Justice Knoll addressed the second paragraph of 
article 1998 in her dissenting opinion.237 The trial court found the 
seller and manufacturer in bad faith, due to their knowledge of the 
redhibitory defects present in the plaintiff’s home.238 Although the 
majority reversed the trial court’s award of nonpecuniary damages, 
Justice Knoll disagreed.239 Justice Knoll, in discussing the 
application of paragraph two to this case, stated:  
In my view, finding a manufacturer in intentional bad faith is 
sufficient to prove the manufacturer “intended, through his 
failure, to aggrieve the feelings of the” purchaser. In this 
case, it is clear the plaintiff’s repeated demands to the 
manufacturer to repair the defective mobile home fell upon 
deaf ears and aggrieved the plaintiff. Thus, I find the trial 
court was correct in awarding nonpecuniary damages.240 
Justice Knoll’s dissent could finally provide guidance on 
situations when the second paragraph of article 1998 could apply. 
As the article stands now, the second paragraph is an unworkable 
and easily manipulated standard, which likely explains the courts’ 
and litigants’ hesitance to invoke it. When amending article 1998, 
the drafters should attach commentary indicating to what situations 
the second paragraph could apply.  
6. The “Multiple Objects” Debate 
Perhaps the most important of the suggested considerations is a 
clear direction on whether nonpecuniary elements need to be 
significant to merit recovery. There have been several standards 
employed by the courts to determine whether nonpecuniary 
damages are available, most notably: (1) whether the exclusive or 
                                                                                                             
 236. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1998 (2015). 
 237. Aucoin v. S. Quality Homes, LLC, 984 So. 2d 685, 699 (La. 2008) 
(Knoll, J., dissenting).  
 238. Id. at 689.  
 239. Id. at 699. 
 240. Id. at 700. See also Beasley v. Ed’s Mobile Homes, Inc., 824 So. 2d 383 
(La. Ct. App. 2002); Ducote v. Perry’s Auto World, Inc., 745 So. 2d 229 (La. 
Ct. App. 1999).  
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principal object of the contract was intellectual enjoyment,241 and 
(2) whether the contract was intended to satisfy a significant 
nonpecuniary interest.242 The second of the two standards listed 
above has been used by Louisiana courts even after it became 
evident that article 1998 was silent on any significance 
requirement.243 The silence of article 1998, coupled with the shift 
in terms by the Louisiana Supreme Court from “principal” or 
“exclusive” to “significant,” has been the source of extreme 
confusion.244 In lay terms,245 “significant” and “principal” simply 
do not mean the same thing.246 However, courts seem to equate 
these two adjectives, as indicated by its use of them almost 
interchangeably in the jurisprudence. Although these adjectives 
have burdened courts because of their use by the Louisiana 
Supreme Court, the analysis of these terms should be 
inconsequential because they did not appear in former article 1934 
and still do not appear in current article 1998.247 The assumption 
that these words have the same meaning has been the root of much 
confusion and underscores the need for clarity on this point. 
The policy decision reached by the committee “was to limit 
nonpecuniary damages to those types of contracts that were made 
to gratify nonpecuniary interests.”248 Thus, the committee decided 
not to require an exclusively nonpecuniary interest, which led to 
the wording “intended to gratify a nonpecuniary interest.”249 This 
“multiple objects” debate has been argued in cases and 
                                                                                                             
 241. Meador v. Toyota of Jefferson, Inc., 332 So. 2d 433, 437 (La. 1976).  
 242. Young v. Ford Motor Co., 595 So. 2d 1123, 1132 (La. 1992).  
 243. See, e.g., id. at 1124. 
 244. Barton, supra note 198, at 345.  
 245. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 9 (2015) (“When a law is clear and unambiguous 
and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be 
applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the 
intent of the legislature.”). 
 246. Merriam Webster dictionary defines “significant” as “having meaning; 
especially; suggestive; having or likely to have or effect; important.” Significant, 
MERRIAM WEBSTER, www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/signify cant, archived 
at http://perma.cc/BA44-X6G4 (last visited Mar. 20, 2015). In contrast, Merriam 
Webster defines “principal” as “most important.” Principal, MERRIAM WEBSTER, 
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/principal, archived at http://perma.cc/F8L9 
-UXF8 (last visited Mar. 20, 2015). 
 247. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1934 (repealed 1985); LA. CIV. CODE art. 1998 
(2015).  
 248. Louisiana State Law Institute, Meeting of the Council at 144 (Sept. 18–
19, 1981) (on file with the Louisiana State Law Institute).  
 249. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1998 (2015). 
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commentary throughout the state without much success.250 Courts 
have classified obligations into three general but distinct categories:  
 
1. Where the exclusive object of the contract is physical 
(pecuniary) gratification, nonpecuniary damages are 
unavailable.251  
 
2. Where the exclusive object of the contract is intellectual 
(nonpecuniary) gratification, nonpecuniary damages are 
available.252 
 
3. Where there are two principal objects of a contract, one 
physical and one intellectual, nonpecuniary damages are 
available.253 
 
The interesting question lies within this final category. Purely 
because of jurisprudential gloss, it is important to decide if it is 
possible to have two principal or significant objects of a 
contract.254 Courts and scholars have not attempted to apply 
mathematical percentages to these objects—nor should they try.255 
Even after the enactment of revised article 1998, where the term 
“object” is no longer present in the article, the courts continued to 
apply the jurisprudentially imposed standard under a different 
                                                                                                             
 250. See, e.g., Young v. Ford Motor Co., 595 So. 2d 1123, 1129 (La. 1992); 
Meador v. Toyota of Jefferson, Inc., 332 So. 2d 433, 437 (La. 1976); Barton, 
supra note 198, at 345; Bloomfield, supra note 52, at 552; Graphia, supra note 
7, at 802; Litvinoff, Moral Damages, supra note 5, at 3; Bruce V. Schewe & 
Debra J. Hale, Review of Recent Developments: 1991–1992, 53 LA. L. REV. 917, 
923 (1993).  
 251. H. Alston Johnson III, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for 
the 1976–1977 Term-Obligations, 38 LA. L. REV. 345, 346 (1978). 
 252. Id.  
 253. Id.  
 254. The reason that this inquiry is determined by “jurisprudential gloss” is 
because article 1998 makes no mention of any requirement of significance. This 
is a purely judicial innovation. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1998 (2015). 
 255. “As repeatedly recognized by the Louisiana jurisprudence, emotional 
loss, unlike financial loss, does not lend itself to mathematical analysis and 
computation.” LITVINOFF, supra note 3, § 6.3, at 157.  
[T]he task of awarding damages for such loss is a unique kind of 
human endeavor in that it requires the trier of fact not only to consider 
the many factual circumstances that are particular to each individual 
case, but also to have at least a working understanding of human nature 
in all its sometimes bewildering complexity.  
Id. § 6.3, at 158.  
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name: “significant interest.”256 An interest can be significant even 
though it is not the most significant or even the principal interest. 
However, the Louisiana Supreme Court has consistently voiced 
hostility to the idea of nonpecuniary damages and instead treated 
these objects as mutually exclusive. It is unknown on which side of 
this debate the current Supreme Court would fall.  
7. Louisiana Lower Courts Favor Nonpecuniary Damages 
Notwithstanding the Louisiana Supreme Court’s hostility to 
nonpecuniary damages, the Obligations Committee should consider 
the fact that Louisiana courts have been more willing to grant 
damages for nonpecuniary loss. In Chaudoir v. Porsche Cars of 
North America, the Third Circuit Court of Appeal awarded 
nonpecuniary damages to the Chaudoirs who purchased a top-of-
the-line, hand-built car from Porsche.257 Although the car was held 
out to be “the finest car in the world,” the Chaudoirs experienced 
numerous malfunctions with the car over the course of the next 
year.258 The Third Circuit concluded that this was not just a 
standard vehicle; rather, it was purchased to satisfy a nonpecuniary 
interest, meeting the requirements of article 1998.259  
Similarly, in Smith v. University Animal Clinic, Inc., the Third 
Circuit affirmed an award of nonpecuniary damages against the 
defendants who breached a contract of deposit.260 The plaintiffs 
dropped their five cats at the defendant’s clinic for boarding and 
grooming.261 Shortly after the cats’ arrival, the collar tag of one of 
the cats was switched with another cat.262 The plaintiffs’ cat was 
mistakenly sent to another client’s home where it escaped and was 
never found.263 Although the court found nonpecuniary damages 
                                                                                                             
 256. E.g., Jones v. Winnebago Indus. Inc., 92 So. 3d 1113, 1121 (La. Ct. 
App. 2012).  
 257. Chaudoir v. Porsche Cars of N. Am., 667 So. 2d 569, 577–78 (La. Ct. 
App. 1995). 
 258. Id. at 572. Among the problems reported to the dealership, a few were: 
“the rubber on the front and rear windshield wipers fell apart” when used; 
“driver’s side remote mirror did not work; the luggage cover was faded; one of 
the interior lights was out; the floor mats and wheel locks were missing; the 
leather seats were dull;” leaking fuel; inoperative radiator cooling flaps; 
electronic functions on the seats were not working; air condition was not 
blowing cool air during the summer; and many more problems. Id. at 572–73.  
 259. Id. at 577–78.  
 260. Smith v. Univ. Animal Clinic, Inc., 30 So. 3d. 1154, 1158 (La. Ct. App. 
2010).  
 261. Id. at 1155. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. at 1155–56. 
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were appropriate, it did not award any damages beyond the charges 
that the animal clinic had already waived.264 
Additionally, in Matherne v. Barnum, the First Circuit awarded 
nonpecuniary damages to homeowners Michael and Carrie 
Matherne for damage done to constructions near their “dream 
home.”265 The Mathernes contracted with the defendant to construct 
a bulkhead, boat slip, and deck on their waterfront property.266 
Within the next several years, the Mathernes had significant 
problems with these constructions, which resulted in structural 
damage ultimately requiring replacement.267 The court found that 
the work around the exterior of the home “was also meant to be a 
major source of intellectual enjoyment for the Mathernes as they 
lived in their ‘dream home’ with beautiful landscaping and water 
access by boat.”268 
The Louisiana Supreme Court denied writs in all three of these 
cases.269 These denials suggest that the current composition of the 
Supreme Court may take a more liberal position on the availability 
of nonpecuniary damages in nonperformance of contract actions; 
although without a case on point this is merely speculative. 
Currently, litigants and judges can only rely on cases to guide their 
interpretation of article 1998. Unfortunately, this reliance provides 
little predictability based on the fact-specific nature of such cases. 
To be in accordance with Louisiana’s civilian tradition, the 
Legislature should begin the process of revising article 1998 yet 
again so courts and litigants will no longer have to resort to 
unpredictable jurisprudence.  
B. Recommendation for Amended Article 1998 
Many critical commentaries of article 1998 and the applicable 
case law can be traced back to one overarching principle—there 
are individuals who are suffering nonpecuniary loss as the result of 
an obligor’s nonperformance who are not receiving nonpecuniary 
damages. This lacuna is largely due to the fact that the courts’ 
main concern is not the loss suffered by the obligee. Rather, other 
factors remain primal in the courts’ view—namely the purpose or 
motive of the contract and how incidental the nonpecuniary 
                                                                                                             
 264. Id. at 1159.  
 265. Matherne v. Barnum, 94 So. 3d. 782, 792–93 (La. Ct. App. 2012).  
 266. Id. at 785. 
 267. Id.  
 268. Id. at 791. 
 269. Matherne v. Barnum, 90 So. 3d 442 (La. 2012); Smith v. Univ. Animal 
Clinic, Inc., 36 So. 3d 247 (La. 2010); Chaudoir v. Porsche Cars of N. Am., 673 
So. 2d 1033 (La. 1996). 
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interest or object is.270 Louisiana courts continue to hold that the 
majority of situations involving nonpecuniary interests do not fit 
into either paragraph of article 1998. There was hope that the 
Louisiana Supreme Court would liberally interpret article 1998 to 
find that any degree of nonpecuniary interest in a contract would 
suffice to trigger nonpecuniary damages. Unfortunately, that hope 
never came to fruition. 
The first paragraph of Civil Code article 1998 should be revised 
to cover situations where, regardless of its nature, a contract is 
intended to satisfy a nonpecuniary interest. This reflects the primacy 
of the nonpecuniary harm felt by the obligee over any other factor. 
Accordingly, article 1998 should be amended to read as follows: 
Damages for nonpecuniary loss may be recovered when a 
contract, because of its nature regardless of its nature, 
gratifies any nonpecuniary interest and, because of the 
circumstances surrounding the formation or the 
nonperformance of the contract, the obligor knew, or 
should have known, that his failure to perform would cause 
nonpecuniary loss.  
 
In addition, regardless of the nature of the contract and 
whether or not the obligor knew or should have known that 
his failure to perform would cause that kind of loss, these 
damages may be recovered also when the obligor intended, 
through his failure, to aggrieve the feelings of the obligee, 
such as in the case of intentional nonperformance. Such 
damages may not be recovered for mere worry or 
vexation.271 
This change would provide damages to the wine collector 
described at the opening of this Comment, as well as any other 
obligee who suffers a nonpecuniary loss that, in the interest of 
justice, requires reparation.272 
                                                                                                             
 270. Bloomfield, supra note 52, at 542.  
 271. Additions are noted in italics. Current article 1998 is reproduced here as 
a comparison:  
Damages for nonpecuniary loss may be recovered when the contract, 
because of its nature, is intended to gratify a nonpecuniary interest and, 
because of the circumstances surrounding the formation or the 
nonperformance of the contract, the obligor knew, or should have 
known, that his failure to perform would cause that kind of loss. 
Regardless of the nature of the contract, these damages may be 
recovered also when the obligor intended, through his failure, to 
aggrieve the feelings of the obligee. 
 272. As described supra Part IV.A.4, the availability of nonpecuniary 
damages is always dependent upon foreseeability. The wine collector, discussed 
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The first paragraph of the proposed revision eliminates the 
“nature of the contract” phrase and instead shifts the main focus to 
whether there is any nonpecuniary interest known to the obligor at the 
formation or nonperformance of the obligation. The drafters included 
the “nature of the contract” language in article 1998 to ensure that 
nonpecuniary damages are awarded only for breached contracts that 
were intended to gratify a nonpecuniary interest.273 This goal seems to 
have been over-accomplished and is one reason courts have applied 
an overly restrictive analysis. Under this model, the nature of the 
contract is irrelevant as long as a nonpecuniary interest exists. 
Contracts that have a nonpecuniary nature are still encompassed in 
this article because of their nonpecuniary interests—not because of 
their nonpecuniary nature. 
The proposed article retains recovery due to the circumstances 
surrounding an obligor’s failure to perform—but is made clearer by a 
reference to any nonpecuniary interest. Additionally, retaining the 
word “may” allows room for judicial discretion, as contained in the 
former article.274 This discretion allows a judge to weigh the 
competing interests of the litigants against the desire to keep frivolous 
claims for “mere worry or vexation,” common to all contracts, out of 
court.275  
This new provision reflects the “Litvinoff approach,” which 
allows for recovery of nonpecuniary damages in breach of contract 
actions where the breach caused a nonpecuniary loss.276 During the 
1985 revision, the Obligations Committee discussed the “Litvinoff 
approach,” stating: “If the obligee proves that the obligor’s 
noncompliance with his obligation caused nonpecuniary losses, why 
should contracts having ‘objects’ primarily of intellectual gratification 
be treated differently from those having ‘objects’ primarily of 
physical gratification?”277 The second paragraph adopts Justice 
Knoll’s dissent in Aucoin and clarifies that in instances where an 
                                                                                                             
 
in the Introduction, could recover damages for nonpecuniary loss under revised 
paragraph one, because of his nonpecuniary interest in the collection and the 
obligor’s knowledge of such interests due to the circumstances surrounding the 
formation of the contract.  
 273. Supplemental Memorandum on Damages for Nonpecuniary Losses, 
supra note 2, at 33.  
 274. The court also has the ability to determine the reasonable assessment of 
damages if they are insusceptible of price measurement. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 
1999 (2015).  
 275. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1998 cmt. e (2015).  
 276. Litvinoff, Moral Damages, supra note 5, at 3–4.  
 277. Supplemental Memorandum on Damages for Nonpecuniary Losses, 
supra note 2, at 16. 
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obligor breaches in bad faith, nonpecuniary damages are available 
whether or not they were foreseeable.278 
This proposed revision attempts to serve as a guide for 
nonpecuniary damage awards in Louisiana. A cause-based approach 
to nonpecuniary damages has proven to be confusing and 
unworkable. By making damages for nonpecuniary loss under 1998 
dependent solely on the extent of the harm suffered, courts can 
engage in a simpler, more direct analysis to determine whether 
damages are appropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
Louisiana courts and scholars alike have grappled with when 
and to what extent nonpecuniary damages are available in actions 
for nonperformance of contractual obligations. The major problem 
identified in this Comment is the inability to recover nonpecuniary 
damages in situations where the nature of the contract may not be 
pecuniary or the pecuniary interest is not significant, yet the 
obligor’s failure to perform causes a nonpecuniary loss. The 
Louisiana Supreme Court has not interpreted article 1998 to cover 
such situations, forming an inequitable lacuna that must be 
remedied. This gap is the source of much criticism by 
commentators, litigants, and courts. Plaintiffs suffering 
nonpecuniary harm, like the wine collector, should be allowed to 
recover damages for their nonpecuniary loss, just like any other loss. 
The proposed revision—which eliminates the “nature of the 
contract” language and definitively ends the “multiple object” 
debate—embraces Professor Litvinoff’s damage-based approach 
and would bring Louisiana’s approach in harmony with many 
leading civilian jurisdictions. A revision of article 1998 is necessary 
to finally bring clarity to an area of the law that has plagued 
Louisiana courts for decades. 
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